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This paper analyzes how presidential candidates Fabricio Alvarado and Nayib Bukele used 
Facebook during the elections in Costa Rica (2018) and El Salvador (2019) respectively to 
develop a particular style of communication that blended populist elements and religious 
discourse. This style of communication extended traditional modes of populism that have 
prevailed in Latin America since the turn of the century (emphasizing the notion of the hero who 
comes to rescue “the people”) but expressed them in an explicitly religious way (stressing the 
role of a “messiah” who comes to alter the established political order). We conducted both 
content and multimodal discourse analyses of 838 posts made by these candidates on Facebook 
during their respective electoral campaign. We argue that the study of these campaigns would be 
incomplete without accounting for the relationship between populism, religion, and social media. 
While populism gave political validity to religious discourse, a religious imaginary provided 
populism with charismatic and messianic authority. This populist/religious reason found an ideal 
expression in Facebook and, simultaneously, was resignified by this platform’s affordances. In 
this way, we assess how fundamentalist Christianity has become a legitimating force of 
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Populism, Religion, and Social Media in Central America 
In February 2020, as the country’s Ministers summoned an extraordinary council of the 
Legislative Assembly, El Salvador’s President, Nayib Bukele, gave a speech in front of a crowd 
outside of the Assembly. After taking a selfie with protesters, he addressed the crowd: “I want to 
ask them [deputies] to let me in [the Assembly]. How many of you here are believers? […] I 
want to ask you to allow me to enter the National Assembly to pray so that God will give us 
wisdom for the steps ahead. Will you authorize me? May God bless you, Salvadoran people.” 
Bukele then entered the Assembly surrounded by the military and sat in the president of 
Congress’s chair, where he proclaimed: “I think it is very clear who is in control of the situation 
and the decision that we are going to make now, we are going to put in God’s hands. So let’s 
pray.” Bukele left the Assembly after claiming he had received instructions from God to be 
patient (Wolf 2021). 
Two years before, in January 2018 in Costa Rica, Evangelical candidate Fabricio 
Alvarado’s popularity (not to be confused with his then opposing candidate and then President, 
Carlos Alvarado) skyrocketed during the campaign, when he publicly rejected an advisory 
opinion issued by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights on the rights of same sex couples. 
He adamantly indicated that, should he be elected, he would quit the Inter-American human 
rights system to avoid the imposition of the LGTBI agenda. Alvarado won the first round of the 
election. When he lost the second round, he kneeled on stage in front of the television cameras, 
raised his hands to the sky, and prayed out loud: “I am not ashamed to believe in and love God. 
We will continue working to defend life, to defend the family, to defend ethics and transparency, 
to defend the great Costa Rica in which we all believe and which we all love.” 
These two examples share several common features: they were performed by political 
leaders who drew on religious references in their speech and non-verbal language; both 
politicians claimed to act as God’s approved representatives of “the people”; both men presented 
themselves as “messiahs” who came to rescue “the people” from dangerous threats; and both 
politicians strategically used social media to promote their messages. Drawing on both content 
and multimodal discourse analyses, this paper analyzes how Alvarado and Bukele used 
Facebook during Costa Rica’s and El Salvador’s presidential elections respectively to blend 
populist elements and religious discourse. Their style of communication extended traditional 
modes of populism that have prevailed since the turn of the century in Latin America 
(emphasizing the notion of the hero who comes to rescue “the people”) but enacted them in an 
explicitly religious way (stressing the role of a charismatic “messiah” who can alter the 
established political order). 
By examining these cases, we provide a first empirical analysis of the links between 
populism, religion, and social media in Central America. We argue that the study of these 
campaigns would be incomplete without accounting for any one of these three issues and their 
relationships. While populism provided political validity to the religious beliefs advocated by 
these candidates, religious imaginaries endowed populist discourses with charismatic and 
messianic authority. Social media offered them a means to materialize this populist/religious 
reason but was also resignified by it. The focus on two Central American countries offers a 
valuable contribution to the understanding of populism around the world. 
 
Populism, Religion, and Social Media 
On Politics and Religion 
Religion has different meanings in different cultures (Fitzgerald 1997). For Williams 
(1996: 374), religion is both culture (that is, practical understandings, conventions, and ways of 
life and experience) and ideology (that is, “an organizing principle for the reordering of society 
[…] clothed in the universalist language of God’s will and transcendent justice”). 
We theorize the relationship between politics and religion as a continuum of positions 
between the politicization of religion and the sacralization of politics (Zúquete 2017). In Latin 
America, the politicization of religion has been tied to the formation of Evangelical parties and 
movements, which must be traced back at least to the Cold War. By the 1980s, Evangelical 
parties operated in 12 countries of Latin America. Candidates from such movements participated 
in presidential elections in seven of these countries between 1987-1998, obtaining legislative 
success in Brazil and Guatemala (Bastian 1999). This success partly resulted from the significant 
growth of Evangelical churches in the region (Pew Research Center 2014). More recently, 
debates about gender, abortion, sexual and reproductive education, contraception, and same-sex 
marriage have taken on great importance in elections in Latin America (Fuentes Belgrave 2019; 
Oualalou 2019; Pignataro and Treminio, 2019; Siles et al. 2020). 
On the other end of the continuum, the sacralization of politics refers to the “calculated, 
deliberate, and partisan use of faith” by political leaders--the “God strategy,” as Domke and Coe 
(2008: 7) call it. Politicians have specifically used religion to set the agenda around certain 
values to bolster support of key constituencies, to sustain a sense of community in the electorate, 
and to appeal to voters’ emotions (Manjarrés Ramos 2020). In this sense, religion is a “political 
resource,” as Williams (1996) puts it, which offers “coherent and elaborated cognitive rationales 
that diagnose social problems, prescribe possible solutions, and justify [people’s] actions--often 
in the cause of universal verities” (p. 377). To implement the “God strategy,” politicians have 
turned to two main factors: emotional rhetoric and religious identities (Chapp 2012). 
Accordingly, some have performed the role of preachers to interpellate audiences and elicit an 
emotional response from them (Pihlaja 2020).  
 
Enter Populism 
Populism offers a useful analytical entry point to understand how positions in this 
continuum are performed. Researchers have operationalized the study of populism by focusing 
on two interrelated dimensions (which we use to structure our empirical analysis in the next 
sections). First, scholars have analyzed populism as a “thin-centered” ideology, that is, “an 
ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and 
antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’” (Mudde 2004: 543). Four 
elements have gathered the attention of scholars in this sense: the essentialist appeal to “the 
people”; the consistent attack on elites; the ostracization of dangerous “others”; and the 
idealization of a given community or heartland (Bracciale et al. 2021; Bracciale and Martella 
2017; Engesser et al. 2017).  
Second, researchers have envisioned populism as a style of communication. Scholars 
have operationalized this approach by examining various elements: the appeal to emotions; the 
emphasis on the figure of the leader; the sharing of private aspects of politicians’s lives; 
antagonistic discourses; the solution of political problems through popular wisdom; and the use 
of informal, vulgar, and simplistic language (Bracciale and Martella 2017; de Vreese et al. 2018; 
Engesser et al. 2017). Although we differentiate these two dimensions for analytical purposes, 
we consider them as mutually constitutive: “thin” ideologies come into being through the 
articulation of certain discursive elements, while styles of communication only make sense when 
employed to define certain (ideological) issues. 
The ties between populism and religion have received relatively little attention (Siles et 
al. 2021; Williams and Alexander 1994). Zúquete (2017) referred to blends of populism and 
religion as “missionary politics,” which he defined as political movements “characterized by a 
dynamic interaction between charismatic leadership, a narrative of salvation, ritual, and the 
creation of a moral community that sees itself with the collective mission of fighting 
conspiratorial enemies, redeeming the nation from its alleged crisis” (453). 
We draw on the work of Max Weber to further theorize the links between populism and 
religion. Weber (2008: 157) defined charismatic domination as “the authority of the special 
personal gift of grace (charisma), absolutely personal devotion, and personal trust in revelation, 
in heroism or in other leadership qualities of an individual” (emphasis in original). Accordingly, 
for Weber, charismatic domination was expressed through the self-abandonment of those who 
obeyed the charisma of a leader. Weber (1968: 48) theorized charisma as “a certain quality of an 
individual personality by virtue of which he is set apart from ordinary men and treated as 
endowed with supernatural, super-human, or at least specifically exceptional powers or 
qualities.” The charismatic person is thus perceived as a leader who has received a special “call” 
to fulfill a role. Individuals do not obey this leader because of any value or statutory regulation, 
but rather because they believe in this person. 
 
Campaigning and Populism on Social Media 
Finally, scholars have also considered the role of social media in the development of both 
populism and electoral campaigning (Aalberg et al. 2017; Gerbaudo 2014; Waisbord and Amado 
2017). Some authors have framed the link between social media and populism as an “elective 
affinity” shaped by factors such as social media’s identity as a megaphone for expressing 
unrepresented voices and the specific affordances of social media that help populists motivate 
people around certain symbols (Gerbaudo 2018; Hopster 2020).  
More broadly, researchers have argued that social media’s affordances offer a fertile 
ground for populism and electoral campaigning because they allow personalizing political 
campaigns and frame them around the figure of the leader; exploiting populist styles of 
communication in contexts of polarization; circumventing editorial and journalistic filters; 
obtaining the attention of different social groups through viral content; creating feelings of 
community, identification, and belonging in the electorate; microtargeting certain publics and 
constituencies with specific messages; using multimodal discourses for various political ends; 
and measuring the “will” of “the people” (through participation metrics) (Bracciale et al. 2021; 
de Vreese et al. 2018; Gerbaudo 2014; Hopster 2020).  
 
Research Design 
This study drew on two methods: content analysis of posts in Fabricio Alvarado’s and 
Nayib Bukele’s Facebook profiles during their presidential campaigns, and multimodal discourse 
analysis of the posts that explicitly mentioned religious elements. To further contextualize our 
findings, we conducted interviews with Alvarado and his campaign director. We discussed the 
role of media technologies in the campaign, most notably social media platforms, WhatsApp, 
and citizen groups that promoted his candidacy on Facebook (Carazo et al. 2021). These 
conversations lasted for an average of 65 minutes. We sought explanations of similar issues 
given by Bukele and his communications team during the campaign. We found some material to 
conduct this analysis in articles published by news outlets and in previous research on Bukele’s 
campaign and communications strategies (Grassetti 2020; Ruiz-Alba 2020). 
Several reasons justify our case selections. Most studies of populist communication have 
been conducted in single countries (Engesser et al. 2017). Yet, (religious) populism also has 
regional characteristics. All Central American countries are among Latin America’s top eight 
with the largest Evangelical populations (Boas 2020; Pew Research Center 2014). Pérez (2019) 
even refers to a “Central American model” of Evangelical political power. Considering these 
cases thus helps capture patterns that cut across the region. Because of the differences in their 
political systems and the diverging results of their elections, this comparison also allows us to 
add nuances and symmetry to the analysis. Furthermore, both candidates have different political 
profiles: while Alvarado was first a religious figure who entered politics later on, Bukele first 
developed a political trajectory in which religious elements have become more important 
recently. 
We focused on Facebook because it is the most used platform in both Costa Rica and El 
Salvador. According to Latinobarómetro (2018), 77% of the population in Costa Rica use 
Facebook (the highest percentage in Latin America) and 60% in El Salvador (the region’s 
average). Facebook also occupied a central role in how both candidates built a public profile as 
politicians both before and during these campaigns (Carazo et al. 2021; Marroquín 2020). 
For the content analysis, we used Facebook’s CrowdTangle app to collect the posts in 
Alvarado’s profile between October 2017 and March 2018 (N = 653), and Bukele’s profile 
between October 2018 and February 2019 (N = 185). To analyze major themes in the posts, we 
built on previous studies to develop a codebook focused on both public affairs (campaign issues; 
government plans; political proposals and opinions about the government, economics, business, 
or the state of the country) and non-public affairs (the private life of the candidate and opinions 
about sports, entertainment, culture, technology, and crime). 
We also coded posts for presence of self-promotional messages, operationalized by 
Waisbord and Amado (2017: 1334) as “references to presidential activity inviting to access 
articles, transmissions, videos, advertising ([including] links or schedule), and/or to attend 
conferences and meetings (virtually or personally).” We coded posts as antagonistic discourse 
posts when they contained “messages that annoy, question, criticize, bully, denounce, threaten, 
or refute any person, media, and institution” (Waisbord and Amado, 2017:1334-5).  
We considered religious discourse as language employed to refer to “thoughts, emotions, 
actions, institutions, objects [...] beliefs, experiences, rituals, [and] moral codes [...] that 
constitute religion” (Sztajer 2016: 115). We looked for both explicit and implicit references to 
these elements in every Facebook post. Finally, we coded for the tone employed in these 
publications (such as emotional, informational, belligerent, etc.) (Bracciale et al. 2021). Posts 
could be included in more than one category (for example, if they were characterized by both 
religious and antagonistic discourses). 
 We conducted discourse analysis of posts that contained indicators of religious discourse 
following the principle of theoretical sampling. In other words, once content analysis had 
provided us with a general understanding of thematic and stylistic preferences in posts, discourse 
analysis maximized opportunities to identify the properties, dimensions, variations, and 
relationships of religious elements. Our analysis of these posts focused on three issues: formal 
(the use of certain pronouns, adjectives, and syntaxis); graphic-iconic (the use of punctuation, 
images, and hashtags); and semantic (centered on the use of discursive strategies). By integrating 
these three dimensions, we identified how both candidates used multimodal resources to blend 
populism and religion. The content analysis thus showed us what the candidates’ discourse was 
about and the discourse analysis showed how this discourse was articulated. 
 According to van Dijk (2019: 9), a semantic macrostructure “accounts for the various 
notions of global meaning such as topic, theme or gist” that provide meaning and coherence to a 
certain discourse. Thus, macro semantic structures can be analyzed by applying certain rules 
derived from the principles of explicit semantics. In order to isolate the sequence of themes that 
articulate the semantic macrostructure of both candidates’ populist and religious discourses, we 
applied van Dijk’s (2019) four macro-rules: deletion (removing all the textual propositions that 
were irrelevant for the interpretation of a specific unit or post), selection (identifying the relevant 
textual propositions that function as interpretative conditions), generalization (constructing 
conceptual propositions based on the semantic details present in the posts analyzed, such as 
“patriotism,” “redemption,” sovereignty,” and “corruption,” among others) and construction 
(developing global facts that are not necessarily explicit in the text).  
 
Fabricio Alvarado: The Mission to “Restore” Costa Rica 
 Costa Rica is often considered one of the most stable democracies in Latin America. 
According to IDESPO (2019), 52% of Costa Rica’s population are Catholics and 27% are 
Evangelicals. Compared to the rest of Central America, the growth of Evangelical churches has 
been rather slow (Boas 2020). Yet, Evangelicals became a political force earlier than in other 
countries of the region. A coalition of Evangelical movements formed the first political party in 
the country in 1981 and another one in 1995 (Zúñiga 2018). These parties obtained their first 
deputy in Costa Rica’s Legislative Assembly in the 1998 election and have had at least one 
deputy in each election since. Despite constant internal disputes and organizational divisions, 
these parties have retained ideological consistency (Pineda 2019: 151). 
 Fabricio Alvarado’s candidacy in 2018 must be situated within this larger historical 
project of the politicization of religion in the country. Alvarado, who was 44 years old when he 
ran for office, is a journalist who had a career as an Evangelical singer and preacher before 
becoming involved in politics. He was elected as deputy in the country’s Legislative Assembly 
(2014-2018), representing an Evangelical party (Restauración Nacional) with a clearly religious 
and conservative political agenda. 
Alvarado was seventh in the polls one month before the election. As noted above, this 
situation changed when the Inter-American Court of Human Rights answered a query from the 
Costa Rican government that favored the protection of same-sex couples’ rights, among other 
issues. In large part because of his response to this event, Alvarado won the election’s first round 




Alvarado’s campaign on Facebook was anchored in a populist separation between “us” 
(“the people,” his political party, Christians) and “them” (the traditional political class and those 
who promoted progressive politics with regards to the rights of same-sex couples). He appealed 
to “the people” by using “nosotros” (we) in an inclusive way, that is, the pronoun was the subject 
of the verb rather than its object (as in “us”). This inclusive “we” was present in catchphrases 
that he often employed, such as “Time to come together” or “Let’s do it together.”  
Alvarado argued he had the obligation to end the alleged corrupt practices of traditional 
politicians. He posted on Facebook: “Christians can participate in politics and not only can, but 
also must. Our countries demand politicians to close the door to corruption and act with 
transparency. We can and must do it.” He thus defined himself as a Christian turned into a 
politician because of a moral obligation. He suggested that, should the official party (PAC) win 
again, religious freedom would be in jeopardy. The day after a debate, he wrote about PAC: “In 
yesterday’s debate we made it clear that there is evidence to show which party has attacked the 
Catholic Church and which party has attacked religious freedom in this country.” This post 
shows Alvarado’s use of the religious freedom banner to include both Catholics and Evangelicals 
into the “us” that was threatened by the incumbent party (“them”). By implication, he suggested 
that, even as an Evangelical, he could protect Catholic values. He consistently sought to 
interpellate Christians in general (rather than emphasizing differences in denominations). 
This blend of populist and religious discourses had one goal: to give the Costa Rican 
electorate a reason to vote for him on election day. Three years before the election, survey data 
showed that Costa Ricans generally say they don’t approve of the mix between politics and 
religion. However, when politics “are linked to a specific agenda, such as abortion and same-sex 
unions, the moral principles proclaimed by religious leaders are activated among believers” 
(Fuentes Belgrave 2015: 73). To further activate the political force of religious belief in the 
electorate, Alvarado combined “classic” elements of the populist ideological toolkit: attacks on 
elites, the notion of dangerous others, and invocations of the motherland. 
For example, in the video post with which he responded to the Inter-American Court’s 
opinion, Alvarado made a political/religious call to war, a somewhat rare act in a country that 
prides itself on the myth of being peaceful. In both the text of the post and the content of the 
video, he incorporated an extract of a Costa Rican patriotic anthem with a high symbolic load: 
“Let us know how to be free, not diminished servants.” He then asked his “followers” to 
mobilize by asking them: “Are we going to keep quiet?” The most obvious response to this threat 
to the motherland would be to vote for him. Alvarado performed the role of a preacher to 
interpellate a congregational political community by conflating Costa Rican citizenship and 
Christian beliefs. He also suggested that the approval of marriage equality would be just the 
beginning of a long chain of events against traditional Costa Rican values, particularly the 
imposition of abortion.  
A key strategy in the populist appeal to “the people” is the use of shared traditional norms 
and values (Aalberg et al. 2017). This was the most distinctive ideological element of Alvarado’s 
campaign on Facebook. Alvarado positioned himself as the true representative of traditional 
family values, in contrast with PAC’s “moral decadence” (Pineda 2019: 157). He also used his 
party’s name (National Restoration) to suggest he was God’s chosen one to “restore” Costa Rica 
through Christian values. This slogan invoked a term with strong biblical undertones to send a 
clear message: with God’s guidance, he could provide much-needed repair or renovation to a 
country destroyed by his “enemies.” He used the hashtag #RestauremosCostaRica 
(#LetsRestoreCostaRica) to tie the idea of restoration to multiple issues (such as the economy or 
the justice system.) These messages implied that he had received from God the charisma to 
transform Costa Rica into a Christian nation. Alvarado’s charisma came explicitly from religious 
practice; it was, as Weber (1968) defined it, a product of specific spiritual exercises and 
behavior. Alvarado was charismatic in the sense that, as God’s chosen one, he received the 
special gifts of grace (from glossolalia to divine wisdom). 
Alvarado pointed to the Bible as the source to determine those norms and values he 
would promote as president. To prove this, he emphasized the centrality of prayer and religious 
mentorship throughout his political career. He posted: 
[Today] I spent some time going to my office and to the plenary to pray and ask God for 
understanding and wisdom, not only for me, but also for my 56 fellow deputies. I was 
joined by my pastor[s]. Those of us who believe in God know that prayer is important. 
Let us pray that 2018 will be wonderful for our beloved Costa Rica. “For I am not 
ashamed of the Gospel ...” Romans 1:16. 
Alvarado suggested that all his decisions as a deputy had God’s approval and presented himself 
as a political intermediary between God and society. Figure 1 shows the pictures Alvarado 
posted as evidence. These images convey the idea of Alvarado as the messiah who would bring 
the Bible (literally and figuratively) to the core of Costa Rican politics. 
 
 
Figure 1. Fabricio Alvarado and his religious mentors  
(posted on Facebook, January 1, 2018) 
 
Communication Style Elements 
 Alvarado’s communication style on Facebook was guided by the premise that the 
mainstream media, which he considered crucial for winning the election, were not paying 
sufficient attention to his campaign (Carazo et al. 2021). He envisioned the media as an 
indispensable ally in reaching the electorate. In an interview conducted for this study, Alvarado 
noted: “When you don’t have resources, the money, social media are the only possibility you 
have to make your messages known. During the first round, we depended more than 95% on 
social media. It was basically Facebook that gave us the impetus.”i Accordingly, Alvarado 
adopted primarily an informational tone in most of his posts (42.7%). Compared to Bukele (as 
we show below), he downplayed the use of emotional rhetoric (10.3% of posts). 
 Even if his low use of emotions was somewhat counterintuitive, Alvarado employed 
many other traditional elements of populist communications. Most of his Facebook posts were 
self-promotional (see Figure 2). An average of 49.5% of his posts were coded as such. In these 
self-referential posts, Alvarado exploited the fragmentary nature of Facebook campaigns to 
invite his followers to watch or follow electoral debates (26%), interviews (22%), videos (12%), 
or share information about meetings he had with different people (22%). In this way, he 
portrayed himself as a charismatic leader in touch with “the people.” He occasionally used 
Facebook to clarify his opinions as a candidate on various issues (12% of his posts) and barely 
elaborated on his political plan (only 3% of posts). 
 
Figure 2. Type of posts in Fabricio Alvarado’s Facebook profile during the campaign 2017-2018 
(in percentages) 
Alvarado also attacked rivals in a strategic manner. During the first round of the election, 
he used antagonistic discourse on an average of 12% of posts. But in March 2018, the month 
leading to the second round election, he significantly increased these attacks (47.7%). A similar 
trend characterized his explicit mentions of religious elements on posts (from an average of 
8.32% of posts during the first round to 27.7% in March 2018). 
Previous research has noted the importance of simplification in populist communications 
(Bracciale et al. 2021). Alvarado employed this strategy by dichotomizing “us” and “them” in 
the products he shared on Facebook. In one video post, he used images in black and white to 
frame religious intolerance and progressive ideas in negative ways, but then employed images in 
color to refer to the traditional family values he defended. He then integrated the audience into 
his messianic cause by saying: “I know you share these values with me.” He concluded this post 
by asserting that he would govern for every person, regardless of religious beliefs. The music in 
the background reminded his campaign slogan: “Let’s do it together.” 
In this example, the light metaphor acquired an explicitly religious expression that 
positioned Alvarado as the messianic and charismatic guardian of traditional values and 
Christian beliefs. He used popular understandings associated with these colors to simplistically 
suggest there were only two options in the election: good and evil. His campaign’s slogan, “With 
clean hands” played with this idea to set himself apart from a corruption scandal that involved 
the official party a few months before the election. In this political/religious dichotomy, his 
political rivals remained in “darkness” (away from God). By using the adjective “limpio” 
(clean), he differentiated his campaign style from those of his opponents, which he described as 
“sucia” (“dirty” in the sense of negative and deceiving). Using a victimization strategy 
(Gerbaudo 2014), Alvarado also repeatedly maintained that he had been the target of fake news 
to diminish his chances of winning the election. 
Finally, Alvarado incorporated ideograms into his communication strategies of 
simplification. He employed emojis that represented the symbol of his party, namely a yellow 
sun (🔆), along with phrases such as “The sun shines again in Costa Rica” and the hashtag 
“#QueSuVotoBrille” (“#MakeYourVoteShine”). In this way, Alvarado further positioned his 
candidacy in a visual dichotomy between light (a better Costa Rica that followed Christian 
values) and darkness (the current and decadent state of the country led by PAC). In this 
dichotomy, he represented God’s chosen one to restore Costa Rica’s luminous path. 
This discourse found great support among Alvarado’s congregational political 
community on Facebook. Commentators wrote to endorse his opposition to the Inter-American 
Court as a matter of national sovereignty. In their view, God’s will needed to be defended by 
“the people,” even against international democratic institutions and laws. Those who commented 
on Facebook did not necessarily hail the candidate as the most experienced or prepared to govern 
Costa Rica, but rather as God’s chosen one. Accordingly, “God” was the second most-used term 
in the comments section of Alvarado’s Facebook profile during the campaign, after the name of 
the candidate (Siles et al. 2019). Commentators expressed their conviction that God had chosen 
and prepared Alvarado and would protect him against attacks.  
 
Nayib Bukele: A Crusade Against “The Usual Suspects” 
El Salvador returned to democracy in 1992 after a long civil war. The recurrence of 
issues around the election of magistrates in the Supreme Electoral Court, electoral violence 
(particularly in local elections), and constant discussions of fraud point to the relative instability 
of core democratic institutions in the country. 
In El Salvador, exactly half of the population define themselves as Catholics but, 
compared to Costa Rica, a larger segment of the population (38%) say they are Evangelicals 
(UIDOP, 2009). The country has the third highest share of Evangelicals in Latin America (Boas 
2020). Although the number of churches has increased exponentially since the 1960s, this has 
not translated into the formation of major Evangelical political parties (Pérez 2019). According 
to Bermúdez (2018: 295), this is because the churches “don’t consider [their] role to be involved 
institutionally in processes that, a priori and fatalistically, they assume to be corrupt.” This does 
not mean that politics and religion have remained distinct spheres. As Bermúdez (2018) puts it, 
the blessing of both Evangelical and Catholic churches provides significant political capital to 
whoever it is granted. Obtaining the political approval of religious authorities is of crucial 
importance in El Salvador, given that churches are the most trusted institutions by Salvadorans 
after the military.  
Since the return to democracy, both right-wing and left-wing parties have consistently 
sought military participation in public security activities by exploiting a Constitutional right 
granted for exceptional circumstances. Between 2003 and 2014, at least a dozen presidential 
decrees were enacted to allow military intervention in years-long plans to deal with criminal 
activity and drug trafficking (Cajina and Orozco 2015). As Aguilar (2017) notes, this has 
allowed the military to show it retains political power in Salvadorian society. 
Nayib Bukele was 37 years old at the time of El Salvador’s campaign. He is the son of a 
Palestinian father and a Catholic mother. A businessman and publicist, he collaborated for more 
than a decade with the communications team of the leftist Farabundo Martí National Liberation 
Front (FMLN), one of El Salvador’s two major political parties. He was then elected mayor of 
Nuevo Cuscatlán (2012-2015) and San Salvador (2015-2018), representing FMLN. After being 
expelled from this party in 2017, he announced on YouTube the foundation of Nuevas Ideas to 
participate in the 2019 presidential election. Since El Salvador’s Supreme Electoral Court did not 
authorize this new party in time for Bukele to register his candidacy, he made an alliance with 
GANA to run for office. Bukele won El Salvador’s presidency with an absolute majority (53% of 
the votes) in the first round of the election, thus ending 27 years of bipartisanship. However, as 
Cativo (2019: 127) notes, “a little over half of the registered Salvadoran populace (53%) 
refrained from going to the polls” in the 2019 election. 
 
Ideology Elements 
Like Alvarado, Bukele distinguished between “us” (the Salvadoran people, who he 
represented) and “them” (a corrupt bipartisanship and electoral institutions) in his Facebook 
campaign. He appealed to “the people” to further establish this distinction: “Our movement is 
that of Salvadoran people,” he wrote. He described his campaign as “the biggest popular 
organization” to convince voters to follow and join his messianic crusade, not in restoring the 
country to a previous condition, but rather in establishing a new and better reality. He captured 
this goal with phrases such as “Let’s change the country” or “It’s time to leave behind the past of 
sadness and violence.” 
He employed the phrase “the usual suspects” (los mismos de siempre) to negatively 
characterize his “enemies”: political parties ARENA and FMLN, and their presidential 
candidates. When he employed Facebook to attack the elites, he mentioned these parties either 
individually or combined 90% of the time. Using this strategy, he linked together a conservative 
and a left-wing party to position himself as a candidate who had God’s support to transcend the 
established political order. He repeatedly referred to ARENA’s campaign as “dirty.” For 
example, in the second month of the campaign, Bukele posted: 
ARENA, in its dirty campaign, has been editing videos to make it seem like people have 
said things they have never said. [...] That’s the “campaign of proposals” they say they 
do. You draw your own conclusions. The truth will always triumph over the lie. Thank 
God. 
Bukele also included El Salvador’s Supreme Electoral Court as part of those “enemies.” 
He blamed the Court for putting obstacles to his candidacy (by not authorizing his new political 
party in time for him to register as a candidate). He explicitly mentioned the term “fraud” to label 
the behavior of the Supreme Electoral Court: “Now that we have the strength of the people and 
as always the help of God. Now let’s stop them and say with all our might: NO TO FRAUD!” 
Bukele solidified this populist dichotomy in two main ways. First, he presented himself 
as a victim or martyr of his “enemies.” Like Alvarado, Bukele accused his rivals of fabricating 
fake news to hurt his chances of winning the election. He used these accusations to frame 
himself as a messiah, God’s representative who had to battle illegal obstacles from his 
adversaries. As Manjarrés Ramos (2020) shows, performing the role of the messiah has allowed 
politicians to position themselves as emissaries who have both a historic and divine mission. 
Second, he employed this dichotomy to further establish himself as a political outsider. He 
typically dressed in jeans, leather jackets, sunglasses, and backward hats thus performing the role 
of a “millennial” who, by virtue of his age, could represent a “fresh voice” in Salvadoran politics 
(Navas 2020; Wolf 2021).  
Bukele’s ideological populism implemented a particular version of the “God strategy” 
through which sought to activate the religious identities of various groups (Domke and Coe 
2008). On the one hand, he accused the “others” of “dirty” campaign when they mentioned his 
family connections to Islam. In response, Bukele publicly condemned the use of God’s name for 
political reasons and warned his opponents about the ill consequences of their actions (i.e., 
pretending to be religious to win the election). On the other hand, and unlike Alvarado, who 
clearly and consistently defined himself as an Evangelical who could also represent Catholics, 
Bukele was strategically ambiguous in explanations of his religious convictions (c.f. Fitzgerald, 
1997). He avoided explicating his beliefs and presented himself as “not a religious person” or a 
“follower of God’s word” who would simply rely on God’s guidance to lead the country as a 
president. Adapting Oualalou’s (2019) maxim about Brazil’s Jair Bolsonaro becoming 
Evangelical while remaining Catholic, it could be said that Bukele became Christian while 
remaining Muslim and everything else. 
Rather than specifying any religion or denomination, Bukele suggested he had the 
approval of all religions in El Salvador. One month before the election, he posted a series of 
photographs that showed him either in the churches of various religions or interacting with their 
leaders (see figure 3). He used these images to show his “followers” that he had a personal 
relationship with God that transcended the boundaries of one specific religion. These 
photographs also legitimized Bukele’s charisma as certified by church authorities. He performed 
the role of the political leader par excellence, a politician whose natural “vocation” was 
recognized even by religious authorities. Bukele concluded this post by noting that, if he were to 
win the election, it could only be because of God’s will. He wrote: “If God wants our country to 
change and the people who bear this beautiful name, El Salvador, to have justice and prosperity, 
then he will give us the victory.” Bukele turned the blessing of these churches into political 
capital (Bermúdez 2018). He typically drew on vague religious vocabulary to sacralize his 
campaign, which he often described as an “act of faith” in itself. 
 
Figure 3. Bukele receives the blessing from Evangelical and Catholic churches 
(posted on Facebook, January 9, 2019) 
 
Communication Style Elements 
Bukele’s most distinctive communications feature was antagonistic discourse. He 
employed Facebook mostly to criticize his rivals and promote his image as a candidate. Figure 4 
shows the importance of antagonistic discourse in his profile during the campaign. An average of 
32.2% of his posts during the campaign were coded as such. Importantly, this percentage 
increased over time. By the end of the campaign, the number of antagonistic posts had doubled 
compared to its beginning. 
 
Figure 4. Type of posts in Nayib Bukele’s Facebook profile during the campaign 2018-2019 (in 
percentages) 
Self-referential posts diminished as Bukele’s campaign unfolded. Figure 4 suggests a 
strategic change in the campaign’s discourse: antagonism gradually replaced self-promotion. He 
often combined both antagonistic discourse and self-referential messages to present himself in a 
good light compared to his rivals. 
Like Alvarado, Bukele did not employ Facebook to elaborate on specific aspects of his 
political plan (only 4.9% of posts) nor to clarify his opinions as a candidate on various issues 
(5.4% of his posts). Those ideas were primarily discussed in a television program created for the 
campaign, called Nuevas Ideas TV (New Ideas TV), which aired various times a week on 
national television. Bukele did not hesitate to refer to Nuevas Ideas TV as “a program to listen to 
the voice of the people.” Compared to Alvarado, Bukele employed an emotional tone--a 
trademark of the sacralization of politics (Chapp 2012)--much more often (22.2% of posts) and 
was less informative (24.9% of posts). 
Another important aspect of Bukele’s communication style on Facebook was his use of 
social media as an actor in the campaign. Not only did he employ social media extensively and 
strategically to promote his candidacy but made sure to bring attention to the role and 
significance of digital media in empowering his campaign. In one “Facebook Live,” he asserted 
he would create the “biggest popular organization” by applying “technology to the territory.” 
By bringing attention to the place of social media in his campaign, Bukele sought to 
portray himself as technologically savvy in the language of younger segments of the public 
(Grassetti 2020). Both Bukele and his communications team have emphasized his involvement in 
writing content for his social media profiles and located his alleged ability with technology in an 
essentialist “millennial” ethos (Navas 2020). Sofía Medina, Bukele’s Secretary of 
Communications, noted: “[Bukele] has always managed his social [media profiles], generated his 
posts, tweets and chosen the photos, among other things [...] The tendency and the curiosity of 
being connected motivated him, he’s always been more of a technological person” (Alba 2020: 
271). Not surprisingly, then, taking a selfie before addressing the audience was his first public 
act when he won the election, just like he did in his speech at the United Nations Assembly in 
2019 and in early 2020 when he entered the Legislative Assembly with the military.  
 
Discussion 
The relationship between populism, religion, and social media has been framed mostly in 
terms of elective affinity (Gerbaudo 2018; Hopster 2020; Siles et al. 2021). As a supplement, we 
argue that the notion of mutual influence more aptly captures the interactions between them (see 
Figure 5). Williams and Alexander (1994: 1) arrived at a similar conclusion in their analysis of 
how “religious language was interwoven in the ideological frames of Populist thought” in late 
nineteenth-century America. In the case of recent presidential elections in Costa Rica and El 
Salvador, populism gave political validity to religious discourse, while a religious imaginary 
provided populism with charismatic and messianic authority. This populist/religious reason 
found an ideal expression in social media and, simultaneously, was resignified by the features of 
platforms such as Facebook. In the remainder of this paper, we develop this argument with more 
detail. 
 
Figure 5. Mutual shaping between populism, religion, and social media 
 
On the one hand, populism gave political legitimacy to the religious beliefs advocated by 
Alvarado and Bukele; it provided them with ideological and communication resources to tie a 
religious agenda to the world of politics. Both candidates activated religious beliefs as an engine 
of vote. Populism also provided them with elements to amplify issues of discontent in the 
electorate. Alvarado and Bukele thus exploited accusations of corruption through a populist 
rhetoric and relied on antagonistic discourse to position this issue in the campaign’s agenda. The 
success of Evangelical discourse relies in part on how it focuses on attending “extra-religious” 
needs (Pineda 2019). Alvarado and Bukele employed populism precisely to anchor religious 
expectations in the realm of earthly politics.  
 On the other hand, religious imaginaries provided Alvarado and Bukele with charismatic 
authority, as well as cultural and discursive resources. Both candidates sought to bolster support 
from key constituencies through religious discourse by showing themselves as charismatic 
leaders. In Alvarado’s case, charisma was produced through the practice of Evangelical 
spirituality. For Bukele, it was a natural endowment certified by church authorities. They 
employed their charisma to demand that “the people” abandon traditional political figures and 
trusted them instead. For this reason, it became crucial for both to demonstrate they were God’s 
chosen ones. Both candidates seemed more focused on establishing this idea in the electorate 
than in discussing political proposals (at least on their Facebook profiles).  
Given its centrality in the religious ideal of leadership (particularly Evangelical), the 
notion of the messiah was also key in performing the identities of these candidates. Both 
politicians exploited it to give new meanings to the role of the political outsider. They also 
employed the messianic identity to portray themselves as victims of corrupt political classes that 
sought to defeat them through “dirty” campaigns and fake news. In response, both candidates 
demonized their opponents by situating “them” on the “dark” side of history compared to their 
campaigns, which had been blessed by God and religious authorities. Alvarado did not hesitate to 
perform his identity as an experienced Evangelical preacher to prove his charisma, interpellate 
his audiences as a religious political community, and elicit an emotional response from them. 
This dynamic acquired greater resonance in the context of countries with a vast majority of 
Christians.  
In addition to issues of charisma, authority, and identity, the dichotomic nature of 
Christian religion (which separates “the people” from God’s chosen representatives) also offered 
these candidates a binary that easily overlapped with populist politics. In the context of 
presidential elections, this binary has acted as a fuel to further polarize the electorate with respect 
to political issues that have acquired an explicitly religious framing (such as sexual orientation 
and social values) (Guevara 2020). In this way, the Bible has become a crucial symbol of 
populist politics: Alvarado brought it with him to Costa Rica’s Legislative Assembly and Bukele 
carried it during his inauguration in El Salvador. In the specific case of Latin America, religion 
has also provided populism with a means to get closer to the most disadvantaged people and 
foster a sense of distance from “corrupt” elites. 
Facebook offered a set of affordances to blend populism and religion in particular ways. 
For example, it provided Alvarado with a means to quickly respond to the opinion of the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights with a call to political/religious war. Both candidates also 
implemented strategies to exploit Facebook’s possibilities for fragmented communication 
through which they combined stylistic elements, multimodal resources, themes, and tones to 
personalize their campaigns, display their charismatic leadership, and offer the possibility to both 
follow and become involved in their crusades. 
By turning to religion, the populism of Alvarado and Bukele drew on “universal verities” 
(Williams 1996) or “‘totalizing visions’ in the form of a quest for redemption from and 
transcendence over increased globalized disruption and materialism” (Zúquete 2013: 267). 
Whereas Alvarado worked to bring a fundamentalist interpretation of the Bible to the heart of 
Costa Rican politics and restore lost religious values, Bukele infused Salvadoran politics with 
religious imaginaries to show that God had chosen him as the new president. In addition to 
providing a means to materialize these “universal verities,” Facebook’s identity in the campaigns 
was also shaped by them. The crusades of Alvarado and Bukele resignified the affordances of 
Facebook by turning this platform into a place where congregational political communities could 
meet and express their support to their messiahs. Facebook became the place for sustaining the 
notion that candidates had the support of “the people” as a political/religious community (Siles et 
al. 2019). 
The combination of populist discourse and religious imaginaries has gained strength in 
Latin America (Manjarrés Ramos 2020; Oualalou 2019). Future comparative research could shed 
light on how candidates develop differentiated strategies for multiple social media platforms 
when situated in different positions of the continuum between the politicization of religion and 
the sacralization of politics. Studies could also analyze how members of the public experience a 
sense of belonging into congregational political communities and the role of these communities 
in various electoral outcomes. Through this exploration, we hope to have contributed to 
theorizing the populist/religious reason and its significance in different parts of the world. 
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